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LAWFARE AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS:  
A QUESTION OF DEFINITION? 
A REFLECTION ON THE CREATION OF THE “KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL” 
Robert Petit * 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
I must confess that in over twenty-one years of criminal prosecu-
tion, both national and international, I had never encountered the term ―law-
fare‖ until I received the invitation to attend this conference. After my initial 
research and the different presentations here, I understand better why. It 
seems to me that this term has essentially evolved out of a U.S. military and 
political context and therefore has had little resonance in international crim-
inal law.1 From the various attempts at definitions, it does appear to boil 
down to the use of the judicial system to further political aims, which, I 
submit, is an essential function of any system of laws.2 That those aims 
seem to run counter to prevailing norms or government interest does not 
appear to change the nature of the system itself which, if it is sound, will 
assert itself through the proper application of those very laws. Laws are 
used to express and define the society that elaborates them. They are an 
evolving reflection of that society, and equating that process to armed con-
flict seems to me to distort their purpose.  
If, however, we intend lawfare to equate to what is more traditional-
ly viewed as political interference in the application of justice, then yes, 
lawfare is practiced in International Criminal Law. For example, it is quite 
clear that political considerations played a fundamental part in the creation 
of the Extraordinary Chambers within the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), for 
which I was the first International Co-Prosecutor.  
  
 *  Robert Petit was the first International Co Prosecutor for the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia from 2006 to 2009 and is now a Counsel with the War Crimes Sec-
tion of the Ministry of Justice of Canada. The opinions expressed herein are solely his own. 
 1 See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanita-
rian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. 
of Gov’t, Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/ 
Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf.; Charles Dunlap, Legal 
Issues in Coalition Warfare: A US Perspective, 82 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 
221, 227 (2006);Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 865, 879 (2009). 
 2 Symposium, Lawfare!, Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Re-
serve University School of Law (2010), available at  http://law.case.edu/Lectures.aspx?lec_ 
id=235. 
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Bringing to justice those responsible for the 1.7 million victims of 
the Khmer Rouge regime would seem such a morally imperative endeavor 
as to be devoid of political ambiguity. Yet, the creation of the ECCC was 
probably the clearest example in International Criminal Law of a judicial 
process beset by political wrangling and used for other ends then justice.3 
That the ECCC has achieved any measure of justice for the victims is a tes-
tament not to its political architects to whom this must come as a surprise, 
but rather to the dedication of its judicial officers. This presentation will 
provide an overview of this paradox. 
II.  FIRST SOME HISTORY 
In April 1975, a Communist movement commonly known as the 
Khmer Rouge took power in Cambodia after a protracted fight against a 
U.S. supported regime.4 Inspired by the most extreme currents of previous 
Communist regimes, the Khmer Rouge proceeded to implement a radical 
reengineering of Cambodian society with combined results more extreme 
than any of these previous regimes.5 Literally overnight, the Khmer Rouge 
abolished all individual rights, forcibly evacuated all major cities to compel 
the population to live and work exclusively in collective farming coopera-
tives, and press-ganged hundreds of thousands of men, women and children 
into slave labor on massive public works projects. Over the course of the 
Khmer Rouge’s three years, eight months, and twenty days in power, they 
mercilessly hunted down and executed hundreds of thousands of perceived 
enemies, inside and outside their own Party.
6
 In part because of having dep-
leted their own ranks through massive purges, the Khmer Rouge regime 
eventually collapsed as the result of a Vietnamese-led invasion but re-
mained a militarily relevant guerrilla force for the next two decades. 7 
Prominent among the new governors of Cambodia were ex-Khmer 
Rouge commanders and other Party cadre who had defected to the Viet-
namese to escape purges and who now served as Cambodian figureheads for 
the new government.8 Eventually rising to the top would be a former lower 
level Khmer Rouge cadre, Hun Sen, who would become Prime Minister of 
the new regime in the 1980s and remains so today.9 
  
 3 Ben Ehrenreich, Cambodia’s Wandering Dead, HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 2009, at 58, 61–
62. 
 4 DAVID CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA 255 (4th ed. 2008); BEN KIERNAN, THE 
POL POT REGIME 7–8 (2d ed. 2002). 
 5 Chandler, supra note 4, at 255; PHILIP SHORT, POL POT: ANATOMY OF A NIGHTMARE 
364–65 (2004). 
 6 Short, supra note 5, at 367. 
 7 Id. at 399–401, 430–32. 
 8 Chandler, supra note 4, at 277, 279–80. 
 9 Short, supra note 5, at 424. 
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Faced with the massive crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge and 
their continued military activities, in 1979 the new Cambodian regime put 
on trial in abstentia two of the Khmer Rouge leaders, Pol Pot, the head of 
the movement, and Ieng Sary, its Foreign Minister.10 Despite the quality of 
the evidence amassed, the 1979 trial was a typical Soviet-type show trial 
where justice was a distant second goal to the primary objective of destroy-
ing the political credibility of a movement that, thanks to Cold War politics, 
still retained international support in spite of its obvious criminal nature.11 
After this egregiously flawed attempt at accountability, no other form of 
justice would be forthcoming for the victims of the Khmer Rouge until the 
late 1990s. 
The evolution of the Cambodian political landscape post-Khmer 
Rouge era is a complex subject and much discussed by numerous scholars. 
For the purpose of this presentation, I would summarize it thusly: the former 
Khmer Rouge elements of the government installed by the Vietnamese, led 
by amongst others Hun Sen, eventually came out on top with Vietnamese 
backing and via their often ruthless use of political, military and police 
powers. By 1997, then Co-Prime Minister Hun Sen and his supporters in-
side the Cambodian People’s Party were in a position to assert dominance 
over long-time non-Communist rivals, notably the National United Front for 
an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC), whose head was also a Co-Prime Minister.12 A Hun Sen-
led coup in 1997 largely destroyed FUNCIPEC, leaving Hun Sen and his 
allies in the Cambodia People’s Party to advance to total control of Cambo-
dia, the situation that exists today.13 At the same time, the Khmer Rouge 
movement collapsed from within, encouraged by Hun Sen’s use of political-
ly engineered defections coupled with the threat of judicial accountability.14 
Most significantly, in August 1996, Ieng Sary, formerly the leader 
of one remnant of the Khmer Rouge, defected to the Government.15 A few 
weeks thereafter, in September, he was granted a pardon for his sentence in 
abstentia and granted immunity from prosecution under a1994 law that out-
lawed the Khmer Rouge.16 However, the language of these dispositions did 
not seem to preclude subsequent prosecution for any crimes committed, and 
indeed this is what has been argued with some success before the ECCC.17 
  
 10 Chandler, supra note 4, at 280. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Short, supra note 5, at 438–439. 
 13 Id. at 441. 
 14 See generally id. at 432–443. 
 15 Id. at 437. 
 16 Seth Mydans, An Amnesty in Cambodia, N.Y. TIMES, Sep, 18, 1996, at A13. 
 17 Id. 
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Somewhat paradoxically, the success of the defection policy 
brought forward the debate on impunity for the Khmer Rouge. In early 
1997, taking advantage of the apparent willingness to confront this issue, a 
U.N. independent human rights envoy managed to convince both Co-Prime 
Ministers to sign a letter requesting the U.N.’s assistance in trying those 
responsible for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge.18 It has been reported that 
the reaction to the June 21 letter by the U.N.’s Secretariat as well as some of 
the P5 was less than enthusiastic. Indeed, the United Nations quickly as-
serted that it did not have the powers under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter to 
create such a mechanism. Yet, in December 1997, a U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution noted the lack of accountability for the crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge and talks with the Government of Cambodia continued.19  
At the time, the Khmer Rouge was still a military force, though 
weakened by defections and decreasing international support.20 The most 
significant remaining Khmer Rouge force was nominally led by an ailing 
Pol Pot and his Second-in-Command, Nuon Chea.21 Clearly initiating a jus-
tice process was a way to further undermine support for the Khmer Rouge, 
both internally and internationally. However, appetite for justice proved to 
be somewhat short-lived even after the death of Pol Pot in early 1998. A 
draft Security Council Resolution circulated by the United States and call-
ing for the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia type tribunal was not even tabled. Moreover, the Govern-
ment of Cambodia asserted that it did not want to discourage further defec-
tions by too much talk about prosecution and started to assert that contrary 
to the June 1997 letter, any proceedings must be of a national character.22 
The discussions with the United Nations were soon to become more like 
negotiations between parties with different agendas. 
III.  RELUCTANT PARTNERS 
The respective positions of the parties were drawn early. In July 
1998, the United Nations appointed a Group of Experts to review the possi-
bility of accountability.23 That same year—following the bloody coup 
against his erstwhile FUNCINPEC coalition partners—Hun Sen’s Cambo-
dia People Party claimed a much-disputed victory in national elections 
  
 18 Craig Etcheson, Designing Justice for Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: PROSPECTS 191, 192. (John Carey, William V. Dunlap, R. John Prit-
chard eds., 2006). 
 19 G.A. Res. 52/135, ¶7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/135 (Feb. 27, 1998). 
 20 Short, supra note 5, at 439–440. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Daniel Kemper Donovan, Recent Developments: Joint Cambodia-U.N. Efforts to Estab-
lish a Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 552, 559 (2003). 
 23 Id. 
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against his crippled opponent, which he thereafter reduced to political irre-
levance.24 
The Group of Experts eventually produced its report in February 
1999. It assessed the extent of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and those 
responsible for them, the existing evidence, the feasibility of accountability 
and the need for justice. However, by then another major defection had oc-
curred; in December 1998 both Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan turned 
themselves in to the Government and to the literally and figuratively, wel-
coming arms of Hun Sen. This was followed by the Prime Minister’s state-
ments to the effect that the Khmer Rouge had now been defeated, that his 
policies had succeeded and that further talk of justice might reignite con-
flict. Hun Sen said as much in a March 1999 letter to the Secretary General 
in response to the Expert’s report. The letter further stated that the Govern-
ment of Cambodia was now looking into a Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission for Cambodia as a possible way forward. 
However, the push for true accountability continued, in significant 
part due to the efforts of Cambodian civil society and the United States, 
fresh from the success of Rome and the creation of the International Crimi-
nal Court.25 Obviously, the United States had its own interests and agenda in 
this process, but nonetheless its influence would prove determinant. The 
United States stated that it believed in the need for credible accountability, 
that such process was tied to future aid to the Government of Cambodia and 
that justice was not inherently a destabilizing factor.26 The United Nations 
echoed this and stated that any such mechanism involving the United Na-
tions must meet international standards and that the Experts Reports rec-
ommendations were useful guidance.27 However, the Secretary General 
recognized that any such effort presupposed the cooperation of the Gov-
ernment of Cambodia, which was less than enthusiastic.28 Following the 
arrest by the military of a high level Khmer Rouge who had not defected, 
Hun Sen reasserted that his trial, as well as that of any other responsible for 
the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, would have to be conducted by national 
courts and that Cambodian law did not allow for foreign judges or prosecu-
tors.29 Furthermore any ―reckless prosecution‖ could threaten stability and 
  
 24 Sue Downie, Cambodia’s 1998 Election: Understanding Why it Was Not a ‘Miracle on 
the Mekong’, 54 A.J.I.A. 43, 54 (2000). 
 25 Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg, How the Khmer Rouge Tribunal was Agreed: Dis-
cussions between the Cambodian Government and the UN, Documentation Center of Cam-
bodia (2001), available at http://www.dccam.org/Tribunal/Analysis/How_Khmer_Rouge_ 
Tribunal.htm. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id.  
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peace, though no problems arose after this arrest, a position that was public-
ly echoed by other officials of the Government.30 
Clearly, the Government of Cambodia, and particularly Hun Sen, 
had seen the threat of accountability as a means to defeat the Khmer Rouge. 
Once that was achieved by military and political means, the price of justice 
seemed far too high. To quote the Prime Minister, ―better to dig a hole and 
bury the past.‖31 
However, another notable arrest, that of Kaing Guek Eav, also 
known as ―Duch,‖ in 1999, as well as continued pressure by some states, 
kept up the momentum to end impunity for the Khmer Rouge.32  
There followed a long series of negotiations that are far too compli-
cated to be detailed in fifteen minutes. For the purpose of this presentation, I 
will try to summarize the key points as follows. For Hun Sen and the Task 
Force he appointed to negotiate with the United Nations, the key issue was 
control of the proceedings.33 These supposedly had to be kept narrow in 
prosecutorial scope so as to not threaten national stability. However, as ana-
lyses at the time and the facts since have demonstrated, this was a non-issue. 
This argument, of course, spoke directly to the personal jurisdiction of the 
ECCC and the independence of the prosecutors to indict those they deemed 
responsible.   
Second, the role of Cambodians, both as juridical officials and ad-
ministrators, had to be pre-eminent, even though by its own admission the 
national judiciary was beset by problems and widely perceived as inefficient 
and subservient to the executive.34 Third, the applicable law had to be Cam-
bodian law even though the applicable penal laws, due to the upheaval of 
the civil war, were a mishmash of very basic colonially inspired legislation 
dating back to the 1950s and a simplified legal code promulgated by U.N. 
authorities in the early 1990s.35 Last, that any mechanism must be Cambo-
dian in nature to respect national sovereignty.36 
As for the United Nations, it tasked its Legal Adviser, Hans Correll 
and his Office of Legal Affairs to negotiate the U.N.’s involvement on one 
single basis: that international standards of justice could be guaranteed.37 To 
that end, the Secretary General eventually spelled out four issues on which 
this could be rested upon: (1) A guaranteed cooperation by the government 
  
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Christine Malumphy and B.J. Pierce, Cambodia’s Search For Justice: Opportunities 
and Challenges for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (February 2009), 
available at http://hrc.berkeley.edu/pdfs/IHRLC-Cambodia.pdf. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Supra note 32. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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to effect arrest and execute the Courts orders; (2) That no amnesty or pardon 
would be a bar to any prosecution; (3) The guaranteed independence of the 
prosecutors—and investigative magistrates—to prosecute anyone they 
deemed within the Courts jurisdiction; and (4) a majority of international 
judges to guarantee the fairness of the proceedings in image and sub-
stance.38 Needless to say, those respective positions led to long, protracted, 
and at times acrimonious negotiations. 
Indeed, at one point it appeared that all was lost. The Government 
of Cambodia, in a bit of pre-emptive legislating, tabled a law on the creation 
of the tribunal that in many ways appeared to go against an apparent earlier 
agreement with the United Nations.39 It then continued to negotiate with 
Correll, but at the same time any further legislative progress was stymied by 
a variety of sometimes ridiculous obstacles, such as delays caused by ter-
mite damage to the National Assembly or the compensation of flood vic-
tims.40 Faced with what appeared to be obvious procrastination by the Gov-
ernment of Cambodia, the United Nations declared that it faced an apparent 
impossibility to reach an agreement even though it had already significantly 
watered down its initial position on several key issues.41 With a possible 
failure in sight, the United States played a key role by, in essence, coming 
up with a compromise on key issues that prevented either party from being 
able to walk away cleanly.42 
In particular, U.S. Senator John Kerry was called upon to play the 
role of an intermediary between the United Nations and the Government of 
Cambodia, and at the same time represent the interests of the United 
States.43 Eventually, what was created was roughly a model of what the 
Government of Cambodia thought it could live with.44 
Briefly, as you may garner from a reading of the Statute and the In-
ternal Rules, the ECCC is a recognized National Court with international 
elements both in terms of personnel and laws.45 Yet it is clearly the still the 
most national of any hybrid courts ever set up.46 A majority of National 
  
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Termites Blamed as Legislators Delay Genocide Tribunal Debate, South China 
Morning Post, (Apr. 26, 2000), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/khmer 
rouge.pdf?rd=1; See also Chronology Of The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Documentation Center 
of Cambodia, available at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/DC%20CAM%20 
Chronology.pdf?phpMyAdmin=8319ad34ce0db941ff04d8c788f6365e&phpMyAdmin=ou7l
pwtyV9avP1XmRZP6FzDQzg3&phpMyAdmin=KZTGHmT45FRCAiEg7OLlzXFdNJ4 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010). 
 41 Supra note 32. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See supra note 32. 
 46 Id. 
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Judges with a minority of internationals sit on all three levels of the Court, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC), the Trial Chamber (TC), and the Supreme 
Chamber (SC).47 All judicial officials are formally appointed by the Cam-
bodian Council of the Magistracy, though the United Nations selects and 
draws up the list of Internationals from which the Council must pick ap-
pointees.48 Those international appointees are U.N. Officials with diplomat-
ic status.49 
The jurisdiction of the ECCC is over the ―Senior Leaders of the 
Khmer Rouge and those most responsible‖ for the crimes committed be-
tween January 7, 1975 and April 20, 1979.50 The crimes for which they can 
be prosecuted include internationally recognized offences such as genocide, 
but also national offences such as religious persecution.51  
The procedural laws governing the ECCC are the applicable Cam-
bodian laws.52 However, where national laws are deemed unclear, insuffi-
cient, or in contradiction to international precedents, guidance may be 
sought from those precedents.53  
In a unique departure from the norm, any positive decision of any of 
the Chambers must be taken in accordance with a ―supra majority‖ prin-
ciple, a majority plus one or two depending on the level.54 In theory this is a 
safeguard necessitating the approval of some members of the international 
side of any Bench before any positive decision be taken. As I will explain 
later, the foresight in creating such a mechanism was well founded.  
The cases are prosecuted by Co-Prosecutors, an International and a 
National, and investigated by Co-Investigative Judges again on the same 
dual nationality principle.55 As there is no overt limit on the prosecution of 
suspects, a unique dispute mechanism was created to adjudicate differences 
  
 47 Law On The Establishment Of Extraordinary Chambers In The Courts Of Cambodia 
For The Prosecution Of Crimes Committed During The Period Of Democratic Kampuchea, 
ch. IV (Oct. 27, 2004). 
 48 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for Prosecuting Crimes Com-
mitted by the Khmer Rouge: Jurisdiction, Organization, and Procedure of an Internationa-
lized National Tribunal, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS; SIERRA LEONE, EAST 
TIMOR, KOSOVO AND CAMBODIA (Romano, C., Nollkaemper, A., & Kleffner, J. eds., Univer-
sity Press: Oxford, 2004). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 
NS/RKM/1004/006, art. 1, Oct. 27, 2004, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/ 
cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf [hereinafter ECCC Statute]. 
 51 Id. arts. 2–8. 
 52 Id. art. 23. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules, R. 17(4) (Rev. 6, 
2010), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv6-EN.pdf  
[hereinafter ECCC Internal Rules]. 
 55 ECCC Statute, supra note 50, art. 16. 
File: Petit 2 Created on: 1/3/2011 5:26:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:11:00 PM 
2010] KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 197 
in the event that either Co-Prosecutors or Co-Investigative Judges could not 
agree on cases.56 In such an event, the disagreement would be brought be-
fore the PTC, and if the supra majority could not be reached, the law states 
that the prosecution or investigation must then ―proceed.‖57 In other words, 
to block prosecution, at least one international Judge would have to side 
with all his or her national colleagues.  
Of note, finally, is the central role of victims as a full-fledged party 
to the proceedings, with legal representation and right of audience, a first in 
terms of scope in internationalized proceedings.58 
As most of you know, after four years, the Court has proceeded 
against five individuals, completed on case in first instance, and will under-
take within months its second one. Any assessment therefore is still early, 
yet can be instructive. 
IV.  LESSONS LEARNED? 
In the end, the victims of the Khmer Rouge got the tribunal that 
Hun Sen and his allies, including other former Khmer Rouge throughout his 
regime, wanted. Whilst no doubt a flawed model, will it bring a measure of 
justice for the magnitude of the crimes committed? It may be too early to 
conclude but certain indicia does exist. During my tenure as International 
Co-Prosecutor, I forwarded for investigation to the Co-Investigative Judges 
three cases. 
The first cases targeted five individuals well-known and indeed al-
most unavoidable: Kaing Guek Eav, also known as ―Duch,‖ the warden of 
an infamous detention and death centre who was initially arrested by the 
Cambodian authority in 1999;59 Ieng Sary and his wife Ieng Thirith who 
was a Minister in the Khmer Rouge the government;60 Nuon Chea, Pol Pot’s 
second-in-command;61 and Khieu Samphan, the President of the Khmer 
  
 56 Id. art. 20. 
 57 Id. 
 58 ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 54, R. 23. 
 59 Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007, Order of Provisional 
Detention (July 31, 2007), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/1/ 
Order_of_Provisional_Detention-DUCH-EN.pdf. 
 60 Case of Ieng Sary, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Provisional Detention Order 
(Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/12/Provisional_detention 
_order_IENG_Sary_ENG.pdf; Case of Ieng Thirith, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, 
Provisional Detention Order (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/court 
Doc/11/Provisional_detention_order_IENG_Thirith_ENG.pdf. 
 61 Case of Nuon Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007, Provisional Detention Order (Sept. 17, 
2007), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/3/Provisional_Detention_Order_ 
Nuon_Chea_19092007_ENG.pdf. 
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Rouge Presidium.62 That case was the product of a year of work by both the 
national and international side of the OCP and mutually agreed to between 
my national colleague and myself.  
This case was eventually split in two by the Co-Investigative Judges 
and Duch proceeded separately to trial first.63 This trial has recently ended 
with convictions on several counts of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes with a sentence of thirty-five years, minus time served, and taking 
into account the Accused admission of guilt and cooperation.64 The other 
four remaining accused are on the brink of being referred for trial on counts 
that will possibly include genocide as well as crimes against humanity and 
war crimes and the trial is expected to get underway sometime next year.65 
By any indication, this will be an acrimonious trial where the defendants are 
expected to mount vigorous defenses, incredibly denying any responsibility 
for the massive crimes that happened under their leadership. 
As to the other two cases, these were the subject of a disagreement 
between my national colleague and me. After about a year of investigations 
conducted jointly by our office, my national colleague refused to forward 
for investigations two cases of five individuals who, I believed fall well 
under the jurisdiction of the ECCC due to their responsibility in the deaths 
of hundreds of thousands of victims. My colleague did not so much dispute 
the evidence or the law as it applied to those individuals, but rather argued 
that their prosecution could threaten peace and stability of Cambodia and 
that the case of the initial five accused fulfilled the mandate of the Court, 
spurious arguments, as I have said. I therefore filed a formal disagreement 
with the PTC and eventually it ruled, splitting along national and interna-
tional lines, the Cambodian judges agreeing with my colleague, the interna-
tional judges recommending prosecutions.66 Failure to reach a super majori-
ty meant that in accordance with the statute, the prosecution has proceeded 
  
 62 Case of Khieu Samphan, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Provisional Detention 
Order (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/13/Provisional_ 
detention_order_KHIEU_Samphan_ENG.pdf. 
 63 Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Closing 
Order Indicting Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/ 
cabinet/courtDoc/115/Closing_order_indicting_Kaing_Guek_Eav_ENG.pdf. 
 64 Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, Judgment 
(July 26, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/635/20100726_ 
Judgement_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf. 
 65 Sopheng Cheang, UN Chief Appeals for More Khmer Rouge Trials, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
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but it also meant that many viewed in the judgment the concretization of 
their fears of a politically controlled Court. That may be too early to assert 
although the future looks bleak. It has been reported that the investigation in 
these cases has been marred by the same type of dissension within the Of-
fice of the Co-Investigative judges and progress appears to be slow.67 
But, progress in these cases, in accordance with the rules of the 
ECCC, is indeed necessary to demonstrate that the institution is operating 
independently. Furthermore these additional cases are important for the 
Court in that they involve facts and crimes that fill an important gap in the 
understanding of how the Khmer Rouge operated so as to cause the death of 
nearly a quarter of the population of Cambodia.68 The cases involve persons 
who were not senior political leaders of the central Khmer Rouge regime 
but yet who exercised power and authority in a way that resulted in the suf-
fering and death of hundreds of thousands of people.69 It was not only the 
―senior leaders‖ who made horrific decisions that violated international law.  
Trials of these cases are important to demonstrate that there is no impunity 
for persons responsible for gross abuses, even if they are not the top politi-
cal and military leaders. In addition, if the Court were to conclude, after 
completing cases against only the five personalities initially accused, as-
suming none of those currently in custody die before their case is tried, it 
cannot be said that the Court has met its mandate to prosecute both senior 
leaders and those most responsible. As a result, it will have trouble justify-
ing its cost in light of the prosecution of only five persons.  
It has recently been reported that the ECCC is facing a major fund-
ing shortage that threatens even Case 002, and that there is discussion of the 
United Nations pulling out after completion of that case, handing over Case 
003 and 004 to a purely national residual ECCC.70 I firmly believe that 
completion of these additional cases represent a minimum by which the 
ECCC could be said to have delivered as much justice as it could. Should 
they not proceed in accordance with the evidence and the law, in whatever 
incarnation the Court may take, some may well conclude that in the end, 
politics won over justice. 
 
  
 67 OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE EXTRAORDINARY 
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, MARCH 2010 UPDATE 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4cbd8e992.pdf . 
 68 Acting International Co-Prosecutor Requests Investigation of Additional Subjects, 
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS OF THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (08 September 2009), 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/news.view.aspx?doc_id=310. 
 69 Id. 
 70 OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 67, at 11–12. 
